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INTRODUCTION 
As we commemorate the inspiring legacy of Minnie Liddell
1
 and 
countless liberation activists who struggled for substantive equality in 
 
 
 Professor of Law, University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law. B.A., Oberlin 
College; J.D., New York University School of Law. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to 
Professor Kimberly Jade Norwood for inviting me to participate in this symposium. Professor 
Powell‘s son attends public school in Jefferson County, Louisville, Kentucky. 
 1. ―In 1972, Minnie Liddell, her son Craton, and several other black students and parents 
initiated the St. Louis school desegregation case by filing suit against the Board of Education of 
the City of St. Louis.‖ D. Bruce La Pierre, Voluntary Interdistrict School Desegregation in St. 
Louis: The Special Master‟s Tale, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 971, 975 (1987) [hereinafter The Special 
Master‟s Tale]. ―After eight years of litigation, on May 21, 1980 the district court held that both 
the Board and the State were liable for the de jure segregation of the public schools of the City 
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education for generations,
2
 it is appropriate to reflect on the current 
state and future of urban education. The school desegregation 
(integration)
3
 movements in Louisville, Kentucky and St. Louis, 
Missouri can best be understood as two distinct permutations of the 
Process Theory.
4
 In Louisville, the process-orientation tilts toward 
 
of St. Louis.‖ Id. Initially, the district court held that neither the State nor the Board of 
Education had unconstitutionally segregated the St. Louis public schools; this decision was later 
reversed by the Eighth Circuit. See Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., City of St. Louis, State of Mo., 469 
F. Supp. 1304, 1309–12 (E.D. Mo. 1979), rev‟d sub nom. Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 
1277, 1281–84 (8th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); see also id. at 1316 
n.4. This was only the beginning of over twenty years of struggle to implement the voluntary 
interdistrict student transfer program. See D. Bruce LaPierre, Voluntary Metropolitan School 
Desegregation in St. Louis—An Opportunity Lost or A Second Chance?, 2 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. 
L. REV. 69 (1982); Dale Singer, Education Trends Could Jeopardize Gains Won by Liddell 
Case, Speakers Say, ST. LOUIS BEACON (Mar. 23, 2012, 11:29 AM), https://www.stlbeacon 
.org/#!/content/23595/wash_u_symposium_on_liddell_case. 
 2. See generally CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON 
THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (Norton 2004). 
 3. In this Essay, desegregation and integration are used interchangeably. However, it 
should be noted that while both terms connote the removal of official barriers of caste-based 
oppression, desegregation is more ―procedural‖ (the eradication of the doctrine of ―separate but 
equal‖) and integration is more ―substantive‖ (the dismantling of dual school systems and 
maintenance of fully integrated schools). See Michelle Adams, Shifting Sands: The 
Jurisprudence of Integration Past, Present, and Future, 47 HOW. L.J. 795, 797 (2004). Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. offers an eloquent summary of the conceptual distinction between the 
two terms:  
The word segregation represents a system that is prohibitive; it denies the Negro equal 
access to schools, parks, restaurants, libraries and the like. Desegregation is 
eliminative and negative, for it simply removes these legal and social prohibitions. 
Integration is creative, and is therefore more profound and far-reaching than 
desegregation. Integration is the positive acceptance of desegregation and the 
welcomed participation of Negroes in the total range of human activities . . . Thus, as 
America pursues the important task of respecting the ―letter of the law,‖ i.e., 
compliance with desegregation decisions, she must be equally concerned with the 
―spirit of the law,‖ i.e., commitment to the democratic dream of integration. 
john a. powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Brown is not Brown and Educational Reform is not 
Reform if Integration is not a Goal, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 343, 344 (quoting Rev. 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., The Ethical Demands for Integration, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: 
THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR 117, 118 (James Melvin Washington 
ed., 1991)). 
 4. The Process Theory is inherently neutral because it adopts an ahistorical approach that 
diminishes the significance of the present day effects of past discrimination, defines 
discrimination so narrowly that it must be identified with exacting particularity, and 
disaggregates any group-based discrimination claims in favor of liberal individualism: without a 
historical perspective, which focuses on the present day effects of past discrimination, the 
forward-looking approach is severely limited in its efficacy. The forward-looking approach is 
doctrinally compatible with the Process Theory espoused by Professor John Hart Ely. See JOHN 
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individual choice—neighborhood schools are at the core of all of the 
discussions about student assignment plans.
5
 Conversely, in St. 
Louis, the seminal process initiative is charter schools.
6
 Neither 
processual outcome addresses the present day effects of past 
discrimination,
7
 so there remain substantial systemic inequalities that 
 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). The Process 
Theory, or representation-reinforcement rationale, does not address the present day effects of 
past discrimination—there is no substantive conception of equality because the Process 
Theory‘s primary focus is on those ―rare‖ process malfunctions that impede access to the 
political process. Professor Hutchinson describes the representation-reinforcement rationale: 
Ely accepts the proposition that judicial activism can present a countermajoritarian 
dilemma, as courts replace legislative judgment with their own values. Nevertheless, 
according to Ely, there are certain circumstances in which the democratic process 
operates unfairly, or where there is a ―process failure.‖ Of particular significance to 
Ely are laws that impede rights closely connected to the political process, like speech 
and suffrage. Ely, however, also argued that a malfunctioning political process—
particularly legislative action tainted by bald prejudice—likely explains why laws 
burden certain politically vulnerable classes. Under such circumstances, courts should 
apply a more probing analysis to ―reinforce‖ the political representation of these 
despised classes. 
Cedric Merlin Powell, Rhetorical Neutrality, Colorblindness, Frederick Douglass, and Inverted 
Critical Race Theory, 56 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 823, 827 n.15 (2008) [hereinafter Rhetorical 
Neutrality Colorblindness] (quoting Darren Lenard Hutchinson, ―Unexplainable on Grounds 
Other Than Race”: The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection 
Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 634 (2003)).  
The Process Theory is a pluralist conception of polity—the democratic process 
generally works well because most groups have access to the process—which seeks to 
provide a rationale for the countermajoritarian impact of judicial review on the 
democratic process. Courts should not function as ―super legislatures,‖ but there are 
instances where the process malfunction is so severe that judicial intervention is 
essential to a full representational polity. While not as optimistic as the traditional 
pluralist conception of polity, see ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY 
AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY 1–8 (2d ed. 2005), Ely‘s process theory rests in the 
middle of the optimism of pluralism and the inherent skepticism of the process in anti-
pluralism. See GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3–
8 (Knopf 1966). 
Id. (some internal citations omitted).  
 5. Mike Wynn, Kentucky Senate Panel Passes Pill Mill Legislation with Change, 
COURIER-J. (Mar. 28, 2012, 2:54 AM). 
 6. See Wendy Parker, From the Failure of Desegregation to the Failure of Choice, 40 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 117 (2012). 
 7. This is because disparate impact is irrelevant to Process Theorists. See Barbara J. 
Flagg, Enduring Principle: On Race, Process, and Constitutional Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 935, 
964 (1994).  
The intent requirement is consistent with a process-oriented approach to constitutional 
interpretation, because it purports to regulate inputs to processes of government 
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have not been addressed.
8
 This is the quintessential problem with 
neutrality—it preserves the status quo. 
John Hart Ely‘s Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial 
Review posits the Process Theory, or representation-reinforcement 
rationale,
9
 to reconcile the counter-majoritarian difficulty of an 
unelected federal judiciary exercising the power of judicial review 
over legislative judgments.
10
 Ely attempts to advance a neutral 
argument for judicial review; yet, it is impossible to do so. Even 
―neutral‖ judgments about process are substantive judgments.11 So, 
process-based arguments about polity and judicial review are 
unsatisfactory in advancing a substantive conception of equality. This 
Essay advances a critique of neutrality by unpacking the Process 
Theory and Brown v. Board of Education
12
 within the contexts of 
Louisville and St. Louis. 
Louisville and St. Louis have turbulent racial histories complete 
with violence, resistance, incremental progress, and regression.
13
 
 
decisionmaking, rather than outcomes. In short, the process perspective and 
colorblindness rule converge with regard to the manner in which disparate impact 
cases are to be adjudged; both militate in favor of the requirement of discriminatory 
intent. 
Id. See also Cedric Merlin Powell, Harvesting New Conceptions of Equality: Opportunity, 
Results, and Neutrality, XXXI ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 255, 264 n.43 (2012) [hereinafter 
Harvesting New Conceptions of Equality]. 
 8. Charles R. Lawrence III, On Democratic Ground: New Perspectives on John Hart Ely 
114 YALE L. J. 1353, 1380 (2005).  
 9. ELY, supra note 4, at 101–03. 
 10. Id. at 102–03 (describing process malfunction and noting when judicial intervention is 
appropriate). 
 11. Flagg, supra note 7, at 956; Lawrence, supra note 8, at 1383–85; Laurence H. Tribe, 
The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1070–
71 (1980); Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process 
Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 721, 742 (1991) (―Any attempt to identify process imperfections 
ultimately must employ substantive judgments.‖). 
 12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 13. TRACY ELAINE K‘MEYER, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE GATEWAY TO THE SOUTH: 
LOUISVILLE, KY 1945–1980 47–61, 251–84 (2009) (chronicling racial unrest and violence over 
court-ordered busing in the border city of Louisville, Kentucky). While Louisville has a dual 
racial identity of a Midwestern and Southern city, id., Missouri and St. Louis are at ground zero 
for race relations in the United States from the pre-Civil War period through the end of the 
twentieth century: 
For two centuries, Missouri has been a stage on which the tragedy and triumph of race 
have played out for the whole nation. The Missouri Compromise held off the Civil 
War. The Dred Scott case helped precipitate it. A Jefferson City inn‘s refusal to serve 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol40/iss1/5
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Certainly, both cities have made significant progress since Brown, 
but that progress has been limited by the race jurisprudence of the 
United States Supreme Court and the systemic limitations inherent in 
each city. Litigation proved to be the catalyst for school 
desegregation in Louisville.
14
 Dramatically, the litigation and policy 
initiatives in Louisville shifted from the eradication of the de jure 
segregated school system to individual choice and neighborhood 
schools. This contrived neutrality, premised on colorblind liberal 
individualism, has significantly stalled efforts to maintain integrated 
schools.
15
 
School desegregation was achieved through the collaborative 
efforts of the city school board, the NAACP, the State of Missouri, 
and suburban school districts in St. Louis.
16
 This nationally 
 
blacks was one of the legal cases that resulted in Plessy‟s separate but equal doctrine. 
Lloyd Gaines of St. Louis won one of the landmark desegregation lawsuits that 
preceded Brown. After the University of Missouri built a separate ―law school‖; 
however, Gaines mysteriously disappeared. The Supreme Court decision that outlawed 
enforcement of racial real estate covenants, Shelly v. Kraemer, arose in St. Louis, a 
few blocks from where the school desegregation case later began. When the Court 
upheld a Reconstruction statute as a bar to housing discrimination in Jones v. Mayer, it 
was again a St. Louis case. And, when the Court brought down the curtain on court-
ordered school desegregation in the 1995 case of Missouri v. Jenkins, the dispute it 
chose was from Kansas City, with the deciding vote cast by Justice Clarence Thomas, 
who got his legal training in the Missouri attorney general‘s office. 
William H. Freivogel, St. Louis: Desegregation and School Choice in the Land of Dred Scott, 
in DIVIDED WE FAIL: COMING TOGETHER THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 209, 210 
(Century Foundation 2002); Justin D. Smith, Note, Hostile Takeover: The State of Missouri, the 
St. Louis School District, and the Struggle for Quality Education in the Inner-City, 74 MO. L. 
REV. 1143, 1147–52 (2009). 
 14. Newburg Area Council v. Bd. of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358, 1361 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975) (court-ordered interdistrict desegregation plan). 
 15. Gary Orfield & Erica Frankenberg, Diversity and Educational Gains: A Plan for a 
Changing County and Its Schools, A Report to the Jefferson County Public Schools, THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS PROJECT 14–16 (Sept. 2011), http://www.jefferson.k12.ky.us/board/student.assignment/ 
(noting that neighborhood schools would produce ―intense segregation‖ and that 40 percent of 
schools are falling below their diversity goals in Louisville under the current student 
assignment plan). See generally Enid Trucios-Haynes & Cedric Merlin Powell, The Rhetoric of 
Colorblind Constitutionalism: Individualism, Race, and Public Schools in Louisville, Kentucky, 
112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 947 (2008); Cedric Merlin Powell, Schools, Rhetorical Neutrality, and 
the Failure of the Colorblind Equal Protection Clause, 10 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 362, 386–
412, 429–32 (2008).   
 16. The Special Master‟s Tale, supra note 1, at 972 (St. Louis is ―the only city in the 
United States that had resolved interdistrict school desegregation issues through a process of 
compromise and consent‖).  
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recognized approach was a success on some levels and less so on 
others.
17
 Paradoxically, even within the context of this success, there 
is an underpinning of interest convergence.
18
 The threat of an 
interdistrict remedy led to a communitarian approach to school 
desegregation, but this approach had doctrinal and practical 
limitations. Milliken v. Bradley
19
 seems to work in reverse in St. 
Louis; integration efforts do not stop at the district line because there 
is identifiable discrimination in the St. Louis school system.
20
 Yet, 
the voluntary transfer program left some of the African-American 
student population in the St. Louis school district behind with the 
promise of quality education.
21
 
 
 17. Parker, supra note 6, at 120 n.9 and accompanying text (noting that ―extreme 
segregation persists‖ in the St. Louis school district); Freivogel, supra note 13, at 221 
(concluding that ―[t]he biggest failure of the [voluntary transfer program] was the portion of the 
program that was supposed to improve the quality of education for the students left behind in 
all-black city schools‖).  
 18. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (―The interests of blacks in achieving racial 
equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.‖). Derrick 
Bell applies the interest convergence theory to the school desegregation efforts of officials in St. 
Louis, illustrating how the primary interest of whites was to create a metropolitan school 
system, thereby avoiding an interdistrict remedy that would link city schools with suburban 
county schools: 
Professor Monti reported that for many years, St. Louis school officials staunchly 
resisted any liability for segregation in their schools. Then, after court orders were 
finally entered, the same individuals used school desegregation mandates to achieve 
educational reforms, including magnet schools, increased funding for training, teacher 
salaries, research and development, and new school construction. According to Monti, 
school officials accomplished all these gains for the system without giving more than 
secondary priority to redressing the grievances of blacks. They told him candidly that 
they used desegregation to create a metropolitan school system, the only sensible way 
to deliver educational resources across the St. Louis area. 
DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED 
HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 124 (2004). See generally DANIEL J. MONTI, A SEMBLANCE OF 
JUSTICE: ST. LOUIS SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND ORDER IN URBAN AMERICA (1985); accord 
William M. Carter, Jr., The Thirteenth Amendment, Interest Convergence, and the Badge and 
Incidents of Slavery, 71 MD. L. REV. 21, 23 (2011).    
 19. 418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974) (holding that ―the scope of the remedy is determined by 
the nature and extent of the constitutional violation,‖ and that there can be no interdistrict 
remedy in the absence of an interdistrict violation and effect).  
 20. BELL, supra note 18, at 117. 
 21. Freivogel, supra note 13, at 221 (―The biggest failure of the 1983 agreement was the 
portion of the program that was supposed to improve the quality of education for the students 
left behind in all-black city schools.‖).  
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Desegregation in St. Louis was not premised on a structural 
interdistrict remedy but on voluntary choice to transfer from the city 
schools to county schools. By contrast, Louisville‘s court-ordered 
desegregation was governed by a consent decree which produced 
diversity in the school system.
22
 Advancing its post-racial 
jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court essentially 
disintegrated the efforts of the political community in Louisville to 
preserve integrated schools.
23
 
It is interesting to note that whether desegregation is achieved 
through political compromise and collaboration, as in St. Louis, or by 
court order, as in Louisville, the outcomes focus on process-based 
values like access (or choice), not substantive equality. On some 
level, the power of ―choice‖ is overvalued. So, while there is 
―access,‖ this means something dramatically different when city and 
suburban schools are compared. This is the classically neutral 
rationale of access, which is at the heart of the Process Theory.
24
 
Part I of this Essay posits the concept of Rhetorical Neutrality and 
sets the context for the Court‘s race jurisprudence in Brown and its 
progeny. Building upon this critique of neutrality, Part II references 
the Process Theory and unpacks it to critique the process-based 
outcomes in Louisville and St. Louis. Part III concludes with a 
critique of a Kentucky statute that preserves the ―right‖ to attend 
neighborhood schools and the limited success of the St. Louis 
voluntary school assignment plan. Louisville and St. Louis represent 
the current state of urban education in America.  
 
 22. GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, BROWN AT 50: KING‘S DREAM OR PLESSY‘S 
NIGHTMARE? THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT 31 (Harvard Univ., Jan. 2004).  
 23. Girardeau A. Spann, Disintegration, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 565, 604 (2008) (―In 
the Resegregation case [Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 
1], the Supreme Court went out of its way to recognize a cause of action allowing disappointed 
white parents to trump the integration interests of minority school children. And it did so even 
though the Court‘s jurisdiction to entertain the claims of those white parents was 
questionable.‖).   
 24. See supra notes 4, 7, 9, and 11 and accompanying text. 
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I. RHETORICAL NEUTRALITY, THE PROCESS THEORY, AND THE 
FORMALIZATION OF BROWN  
In Rhetorical Neutrality, Colorblindness, Frederick Douglass, and 
Inverted Critical Race Theory, I describe the narrative devices 
employed by the Court to preserve the status quo: 
Rhetorical Neutrality is the linchpin of the Court‘s colorblind 
jurisprudence. Three underlying myths—historical, 
definitional, and rhetorical—all serve to shift the interpretative 
(doctrinal) framework on questions of race from an analysis of 
systemic racism to a literal conception of equality where the 
anti-differentiation principle is the guiding touchstone. ―The 
traditional fonts of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence—the 
anti-subjugation and anti-caste principles—have been 
effectively replaced by an anti-differentiation principle.‖ 
Literal equality, without regard to context or history, is the 
unifying principle of the Court‘s race jurisprudence.25 
Inequality and discrimination become ―natural‖ because history is 
ignored, discrimination is defined so narrowly that it does not exist, 
and neutral rhetoric explains the permanence of inequality.
26
 In the 
school context, resegregation is rationalized as a natural occurrence 
after formal segregation is eradicated.
27
 Indeed, the discussion has 
shifted from substantive equality to the neutral rhetoric of choice 
(neighborhood schools, charter schools, and the marketplace model 
of educational reform). It should not be surprising that the ―success‖ 
achieved in Louisville and St. Louis has been episodic with the ever-
present threat of resegregation on the horizon. We should reject the 
allure of neutrality and again embrace a theory of substantive rights.
28
 
 
 25. Rhetorical Neutrality Colorblindness, supra note 4, at 831. 
 26. Id. at 831 nn.31–33. 
 27. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 750 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (―At most, those statistics show a national trend toward classroom 
racial imbalance. However, racial imbalance without intentional state action to separate the 
races does not amount to segregation.‖). 
 28. Neil Gotanda, Reflections on Korematsu, Brown, and White Innocence, 13 TEMP. 
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 663, 673–74 (2004). 
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The Process Theory defines how judicial review is exercised and 
how the political system functions, with an emphasis on participatory 
access, and it describes the rare blockages that undermine such 
access.
29
 A series of Fourteenth Amendment decisions offer striking 
examples of Rhetorical Neutrality and how process is at the center of 
the Court‘s decision-making so that there inevitably will be inherent 
limitations on what cities like Louisville and St. Louis can 
accomplish in fully integrating schools. Virtually all of the Court‘s 
race decisions are incomplete
30—they do not address, in any 
meaningful way, the continuing affects of structural inequality.
31
 
Thus, even a landmark decision like Brown is incomplete; there is a 
duality in the opinion of substance and process: 
[T]he Court has focused on the process underpinnings of 
Brown. The Court embraces integration as a process value, but 
the hard work of implementation, monitoring, and enforcement 
was left to the equitable powers of federal courts. Over the 
years, the Court has hastily retreated from the substantive 
mandate of Brown. The substantive contours of Brown are 
conspicuously absent in all of the Court's race decisions.
32
 
This retreat from the substantive mandate of Brown is evident not 
only in the Court‘s school desegregation decisions but in state and 
local school board decision-making as well. ―Brown is about the 
tension between process (equal educational opportunity through 
desegregation) and results (dismantling dual school systems and 
substantively integrating schools).‖33 The school systems of 
Louisville and St. Louis have had mixed success in achieving the 
goal of fully integrated school systems.
34
 This is because the meaning 
 
 29. ELY, supra note 4, at 103. 
 30. Rhetorical Neutrality Colorblindness, supra note 4, at 824–88 (discussing neutrality 
as the doctrinal fulcrum of the Court‘s race jurisprudence and critiquing colorblind 
constitutionalism). 
 31. Cheryl I. Harris, Equal Treatment and the Reproduction of Inequality, 69 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1753, 1757 (2001) (discussing how ―the law functions to actually promote and entrench 
subordination‖); Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural 
Interpretation, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 465 (1996).  
 32. Rhetorical Neutrality Colorblindness, supra note 4, at 876. 
 33. Harvesting New Conceptions of Equality, supra note 7, at 275 (emphasis in original). 
 34. Parker, supra note 6, at 135–42; Orfield & Frankenberg, supra note 15, at 14–16. 
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of Brown has changed in the fifty-eight years since the Court 
proclaimed that ―separate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal.‖35 It is striking that both school systems ultimately reached 
process-oriented outcomes whether there was a court-ordered consent 
decree, as in Louisville, or the threat of a court-imposed remedy, as 
in St. Louis. This suggests that the systems are predisposed to 
―neutral‖ process-based outcomes and that the prospect of 
transformative racial justice is limited: 
The fact that the process orientation aims at targets other than 
racial justice has been apparent from the time of Brown v. 
Board of Education, when some process theorists were among 
the ruling‘s most vocal critics, generally in spite of their 
personal approval of the decision. As post-Brown 
constitutional doctrine has unfolded, the pattern has been 
repeated: processual considerations operate to counteract the 
evolution of doctrines that might genuinely benefit non-whites, 
though proponents of process values continue to express 
approval of the substantive goal of racial justice. Process 
principles consistently have been elevated above the measures 
that promise to address the continuing reality of racial 
inequality.
36
 
In the aftermath of the Court‘s decision in Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,
37
 which 
dismantled the Louisville political community‘s good faith efforts to 
maintain integrated schools through a voluntary school assignment 
plan,
38
 there was a dramatic shift from a substantive remedial focus to 
liberal individualism in the form of neighborhood schools.
39
 
 
 35. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 36. Flagg, supra note 7, at 937; see supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 37. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 38. ―There is no credible argument that either the text or the original intent of the 
Constitution requires the Supreme Court to invalidate integration programs that are voluntarily 
adopted by politically accountable, white majoritarian, government policymaking officials.‖ 
Spann, supra note 23, at 628. 
 39. Chris Kenning & Antoinette Konz, JCPS has Learned that Families Want to Make the 
Choice on Their Preferred School . . . whether it is down the street or across town, COURIER-
JOURNAL.COM (June 24, 2012), http://www.courier-journal.com/article/20120624/news0105 
(discussing distinction between neighborhood schools and choice; and, stating that while 53 
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Likewise, in St. Louis, the shift is from quality education in the city 
schools
40
 to individual choice (access) to charter schools. Racial 
justice becomes a secondary concern because neutrality and process 
are the dominant factors in constitutional interpretation and policy 
implementation. These process-based results are inevitable when 
viewed in light of the formalization of Brown. 
From its colorblind jurisprudence to its post-racial jurisprudence,
41
 
the Court consistently articulates a process view of polity so that 
substantive considerations of race are ignored. The Court‘s decisions 
are all process-oriented decisions which conceptualize federal power 
as inherently anti-democratic and intrusive; federal power should be 
limited in the name of local control.
42
 This is the first step in re-
 
percent of 8,100 kindergarten applications chose the schools closest to their homes, 47 percent 
chose a different school even if it meant a longer bus ride). Of course, this does not address the 
problem of the impact of segregated housing on school choice. Certainly, parents can choose to 
attend their neighborhood school or one farther away, but integration will be severely limited if 
these choices are exercised in the context of segregated housing.   
 40. In St. Louis, there were a substantial number of black students left behind in the city 
schools as a component of the settlement that was the foundation of the voluntary interdistrict 
student transfer program. ―The drafters of the Settlement Agreement recognized that, even after 
full implementation of both the voluntary inter-district transfer and magnet school programs, 
approximately 10,000–15,000 black students would remain in all-black city schools.‖ The 
Special Master‟s Tale, supra note 1, at 1005. This compromise acknowledges the existence of 
some segregation in the schools, but ―quality‖ education will somehow mitigate the impact of 
segregated educational opportunities. ―In short, despite the money spent on the quality of 
education in the all-black schools, neither the schoolhouses nor what was taught inside was 
equal to the suburban schools.‖ Freivogel, supra note 13, at 222; Smith, supra note 13, at 1153.  
 41. Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1593 (2009) (discussing post-
racialism as an ideology). 
 42. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100–03 (1995) (holding that interdistrict 
remedy of increased spending to bring whites into the school district was invalid in the absence 
of an interdistrict violation); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490–91, (1992) (holding that 
federal courts should return supervisory control to local authorities as soon as possible; indeed, 
federal control may be withdrawn completely or partially based on good-faith compliance with 
the desegregation decree); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991) (explaining that 
based on a good-faith finding of compliance, a district court may dissolve a desegregation order 
where the vestiges of de jure segregation had been eradicated ―to the extent practicable‖); 
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436–37 (1976) (stressing a temporal 
limit on federal court intervention, the Court concluded that once a court implemented a racially 
neutral attendance plan, in the absence of intentional racially discriminatory actions by the 
school board, the court could not adjust its desegregation order to address population shifts in 
the school district); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745, 752 (1974) (holding that 
interdistrict remedies must be specifically tailored to address interdistrict violations). It appears 
that the Court exercises its power of judicial review to preserve neutral process values except 
when a community chooses a substantive, race-conscious remedy. Then the Court will 
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conceptualizing Brown, which ultimately leads to its post-racial 
incarnation and the emergence of neutrality at the state and local 
levels. There are several doctrinal developments that lead to the 
formalized conception of equality that is the touchstone of the 
Court‘s school desegregation jurisprudence: (i) the Court initially 
adopts a structural view of inequality in segregated school systems; 
(ii) this conception is replaced by a narrow view of federal power in 
eradicating the present day effects of past discrimination; and 
(iii) ultimately, neutrality becomes the guiding principle in school 
cases through the formalistic conception of equality adopted by the 
Court in Parents Involved. These doctrinal boundaries impact 
communities like Louisville and St. Louis when they implement 
integration plans. Moreover, Louisville and St. Louis serve as 
paradigmatic examples of the shift from substance to process. 
In 1968 and 1971, the Court rejects neutrality and adopts a 
structural view of inequality in Green v. County School Board
43
 and 
an expansive conception of federal judicial power in dismantling dual 
school systems in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of 
Education.
44
 These decisions represent the epoch of judicial efforts to 
integrate schools. Within only three years of the highpoint that was 
Swann, the Court orders an abrupt end to these efforts in Milliken v. 
Bradley.
45
 
In Green, the Court advances a structural conception of inequality 
and rejects an early incarnation of school ―choice.‖ Rejecting an 
ostensibly neutral ―freedom-of-choice‖ plan, ―which allows a pupil to 
choose his own public school,‖46 the Court held that school boards 
had an affirmative duty ―to convert to a unitary system in which 
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.‖47 
Essentially, the Court discards neutrality and focuses on the systemic 
 
intervene to overturn such a result even if it means preserving de facto segregation in the 
schools. See Wendy Parker, Limiting the Equal Protection Clause Roberts Style, 63 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 507, 533–34 (2009); Spann, supra note 23, at 628–30.  
 43. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
 44. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 45. 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Harvesting New Conceptions of Equality, supra note 7, at 279–
85. 
 46. Green, 391 U.S. at 431–32. 
 47. Id. at 438. 
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and structural nature of discrimination—formalistic notions of 
equality will be rejected where it is obvious that the plan does not 
―[promise] meaningful and immediate progress toward 
disestablishing state-imposed segregation.‖48 It is no small irony that 
―choice‖ is at the forefront of our efforts to ―improve‖ our schools 
with integration as a secondary goal.
49
 We have come full circle, 
embracing the very arguments that maintained segregated schools 
decades ago. The neutral allure of process obscures the devastating 
impact of the purportedly neutral policies grouped under the category 
denoted as ―choice.‖ 
In Louisville, neighborhood schools, which are the result of an 
updated version of the freedom-of-choice plan held unconstitutional 
in Green, are at the center of policy and legislative initiatives. In St. 
Louis, the charter school movement dominates the policy debate. All 
of this is the result of how the Court neutralized substantive efforts at 
eradicating the present day effects of past discrimination. 
Following Green, the Court in Swann articulates a broad 
conception of federal equitable judicial power. Building upon its 
structural conception of inequality as a condition that must be 
eliminated ―root and branch,‖ the Court concludes that ―[i]f school 
authorities fail in their affirmative obligations under these holdings, 
judicial authority may be invoked. Once a right and violation have 
been shown, the scope of a district court‘s equitable powers to 
remedy past wrongs is broad.‖50 Green and Swann are seminal 
decisions because they explicitly acknowledge the significance of 
race in dismantling dual school systems and that remedial efforts 
must be broad.
51
 This is a rejection of neutrality and processual 
outcomes. History is an integral part of the analysis in Green: the 
Court‘s admonition to eliminate segregated schools ―root and branch‖ 
is a response to fourteen years of delay following Brown.
52
 Swann‘s 
 
 48. Id. at 439, 439–41. 
 49. Parker, supra note 6, at 135 (noting that St. Louis charter schools are ―hyper-
segregated‖). 
 50. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). 
 51. John Charles Boger, Willful Colorblindness: The New Racial Piety and the 
Resegregation of Public Schools, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1719, 1733–34 (2000).  
 52. Green, 391 U.S. at 438–39 (emphasis in original) (―The time for mere ‗deliberate 
speed‘ has run out . . . The burden on a school board is to come forward with a plan that 
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broad conception of federal equitable power to eradicate segregated 
school systems is an acknowledgement of the structural nature of 
inequality referenced in Green.  
Segregation (or discrimination in school assignments) is defined 
broadly so that the scope of the remedy is broad—race-conscious 
remedies are embraced, and neutral rationales that support the 
existing patterns of segregation are rejected. This period of 
substantive approaches to the eradication of segregated schools was 
short lived. Once the Court adopts a process-oriented view of school 
desegregation, cities like Louisville and St. Louis would be affected 
in terms of the remedial policies implemented to preserve diversity in 
the schools. This is because decisions like Milliken v. Bradley
53
 and 
Washington v. Davis
54
 redefine discrimination and narrowly 
circumscribe race-conscious remedial measures to fully integrate 
schools. From 1974 on, the Court retreats from an expansive view of 
substantive equality to a processual conception of equality.
55
 This 
ultimately leads to the Court‘s decision declaring the Louisville 
school assignment plan unconstitutional and the process-based 
approach to choice that is the hallmark of the St. Louis voluntary 
student transfer program. 
Milliken v. Bradley marks the beginning of the Court‘s retreat 
from substantive equality to a process-based conception of individual 
rights.  Rejecting an interdistrict remedy, which would have unified 
the segregated inner-city schools in Detroit with the outlying white 
suburbs, the Court holds that ―[w]ithout an interdistrict violation and 
interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an 
interdistrict remedy.‖56 ―The Court literally ignores evidence of 
systemic racial discrimination in order to preserve suburban school 
districts and insulate them from the burden of urban integration.‖57 
 
promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now.‖).  
 53. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 54. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 55. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, 
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimization in Anti-Discrimination Law, in 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 103, 105 
(Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (discussing the restrictive view of equal 
opportunity which treats equality as a process).  
 56. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745.  
 57. Harvesting New Conceptions of Equality, supra note 7, at 279 n.146. 
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Only three years after the majestic remedial mandate in Swann, the 
Court, for the first time, overrules a desegregation decree and 
―rationalized a segregated result in a case where a constitutional 
violation had been found to exist.‖58 Milliken narrowly defines 
discrimination: remedial efforts must stop at the district line in the 
absence of an interdistrict violation (a form of system-based intent) 
and interdistrict effect. There must be identifiable, district-wide 
segregation. The implicit intent requirement referenced in Milliken is 
formalized in Washington v. Davis.
59
 
Invalidating the claims of disproportionate failure rates of 
African-American applicants for the Washington, D.C. police 
department, the Court holds that disproportionate impact was 
insufficient to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation.
60
 ―The 
decision also references the school desegregation cases for the 
proposition that there must be discriminatory intent.‖61 There is a 
bright line distinction between de jure (intentional) and de facto (in 
fact) discrimination.
62
 
The meaning of Brown was transformed though three rhetorical 
themes in the Court‘s race decisions: (i) history is conceptualized as 
neutral, so it does not have to be acknowledged, and there is no 
attention to the present day effects of past discrimination; 
(ii) discrimination is defined so narrowly that it either does not exist 
(disproportionate impact is irrelevant), or, if it does, it has to be 
identified with particularized specificity in the form of an intent 
requirement;
63
 and, finally, (iii) equality itself is neutralized so that 
Brown is not about transformative racial justice at all. 
Formalistically, Brown is about individual school choice 
unencumbered by race. 
These themes are at the core of the Process Theory. The Process 
Theory is inherently forward-looking, so history is inconsequential; 
 
 58. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16–19, at 1495 (2d ed. 
1988) (footnotes omitted).  
 59. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 60. Id. at 244. 
 61. Harvesting New Conceptions of Equality, supra note 7, at 283–84. 
 62. Id. at 284. 
 63. Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 1537, 1566–68 (2004). 
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and because the system is generally well-functioning, individuals can 
organize themselves into groups to advance their discrete interests. 
So, any systemic discrimination is aberrational and must be identified 
through a finding of intent (state action).
64
 This means that a 
substantial portion of structural inequality, racial disparities, and 
unconscious racism is left unchecked and intact.
65
 It also means that 
the neutral allure of such remedial ―innovations‖ as choice, charter 
schools, and neighborhood schools will have a disconcerting 
appeal—it is much easier to pursue process-based neutrality than 
substantive racial equality.
66
 ―Like freedom-of-choice plans in the 
1960s, charter schools today are designed not only to allow 
segregation, but to facilitate segregation.‖67 Thus, in St. Louis, there 
is a ―continuing pattern of hyper-segregated schools at both the 
traditional and charter schools, with charter schools slightly more 
hyper-segregated by race.‖68 In Louisville, the ―appeal‖ of 
neighborhood schools will ultimately lead to resegregation.
69
 This 
neutral appeal can be traced directly to Parents Involved. 
A. Parents Involved, Inversion, and Neutrality 
Under the post-racial Equal Protection Clause, Brown is not about 
race at all—it is about individual school choice without the result-
oriented politics of race. The emphasis is on access and opportunity, 
not substantive equality.
70
 Parents Involved is one of the Roberts 
Court‘s first post-racial decisions. It is a seminal decision because it 
marks the transformation of the Court‘s race jurisprudence from 
colorblind constitutionalism to post-racialism:
71
 
In Parents Involved, the Court shifts course and invalidates 
voluntary plans adopted by the Louisville and Seattle school 
 
 64. Lawrence, supra note 8, at 1378–79. 
 65. Id. at 1379–81; Flagg, supra note 7, at 967. 
 66. john a. powell, The Tensions Between Integration and School Reform, 28 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 655, 691–92 (2001). 
 67. Parker, supra note 6, at 122. 
 68. Id. at 136. 
 69. Orfield & Frankenberg, supra note 15, at 14–15. 
 70. Harvesting New Conceptions of Equality, supra note 7, at 267–74.  
 71. Cho, supra note 41, at 1593. 
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boards. The Court rejects local decision-making because the 
sole purpose of both plans was racial balancing. . . . Racial 
balancing is unconstitutional because it guarantees a result—a 
specified quantum of racial proportionality in the schools—
based on race. The Court advances four distinct doctrinal 
strands to form the post-racial decision in Parents Involved: 
(i) it elevates the de jure-de facto distinction as a standing 
requirement that essentially eliminates any consideration of 
race in the absence of specific discrimination;
72
 (ii) it promotes 
liberal individualism as the touchstone of Fourteenth 
Amendment analysis so that an individual‟s school choice is 
commodified and the anti-subordination principle is 
fundamentally displaced;
73
 (iii) the spectra of racial politics is 
employed to emphasize the ―illegitimacy‖ of local decision-
making premised on race;
74
 and (iv) the protection of the 
interests of innocent whites is an unifying theme under all of 
the rationales discussed here.
75
  
Parents Involved is obviously a decision deeply rooted in process—
the entire analytical and rhetorical structure of the decision is 
constructed to preserve the status quo. The Fourteenth Amendment is 
inverted so that the anti-subordination principle is turned inside out.
76
 
―The Process Theory, rather than providing a rationale for principled 
judicial review, becomes a justification for leaving entrenched 
systems of discrimination in place.‖77 All of the components of 
Rhetorical Neutrality
78
 are present in Parents Involved: 
 
 72. Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720–21, 736–
37 (2007). 
 73. Id. at 742–43. 
 74. Id. at 744–48. 
 75. Harvesting New Conceptions of Equality, supra note 7, at 286 (emphasis in original) 
(footnotes omitted); Flagg, supra note 7, at 976 (―In sum, the process perspective is thoroughly 
white. It was formulated by white people, and it has had a significant and systematically 
adverse impact on the fortunes of non-whites in the development of race discrimination 
doctrine.‖); see supra notes 17, 18, 21 and 39 and accompanying text.  
 76. Cedric Merlin Powell, Blinded By Color: The New Equal Protection, the Second 
Deconstruction, and Affirmative Inaction, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 191, 199–220 (1997).  
 77. Rhetorical Neutrality Colorblindness, supra note 4, at 858. 
 78. See supra Part I. 
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1. Since the consent decree was lifted in 2000 in Louisville, 
there is no constitutionally cognizable discrimination to 
remedy; therefore, any use of race is constitutionally suspect;
79
 
2. The de jure-de facto distinction means that there will be 
some inequality that is unreachable—de facto discrimination is 
―natural‖ because it is not caused by state action;80 
3. Liberal individualism is a normative constitutional 
principle, so individual school choice displaces the 
constitutional mandate to eradicate dual schools systems and 
preserve fully integrated schools;
81
 and  
4. Housing segregation is viewed as a natural occurrence 
premised on voluntary choices made by individuals, so 
profound racial imbalance is rationalized as something other 
than segregation.
82
 
All of these process-based propositions serve to insulate the process 
from substantive change and shift the focus to neutralized claims. 
B. The Emergence of “Choice” 
The notion of ―choice‖ is quite appealing; it is rooted in process 
and liberal individualism and derives its analytical appeal from the 
marketplace model of an open process, accessible to all. Of course, 
this has not been the experience of Louisville or St. Louis. Louisville 
is embroiled in a contest over the validity of neighborhood schools,
83
 
 
 79. Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. at 720–21, 732–
33. 
 80. Id. at 736–37. 
 81. Id. at 743. 
 82. Id. at 750 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (―Racial imbalance is not 
segregation. Although presently observed racial imbalance might result from de jure 
segregation, racial imbalance can also result from any number of innocent private decisions, 
including voluntary housing choices.‖).  
 83. See infra Part III.A; powell, supra note 66, at 692 (―From the perspective of the 
modern integrationist, neighborhood schools are troubling because they do not promote 
numerical desegregation nor equivalency in student outcomes. The radical integrationist 
problematizes this reform structure as well because the reversion to residence-determined 
attendance means a return to pre-Brown isolation of students of color from democracy-
promoting structures.‖).  
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and St. Louis is grappling with the efficacy of charter schools.
84
 The 
issue of race has been neutralized, and the focus is on process. The 
appeal of neutrality is dangerous because it gives us the assurance of 
moving forward without addressing the seminal problem of race and 
structural inequality:
85
 
Choice is presently constructed in this society as an unfettered 
good. As such, we implicitly assume that the more choice the 
better, and that a world with unlimited choice would be ideal. 
Choice is also seen as an individual act based largely on 
personal preference unmediated through social space and 
institutions. Therefore, autonomy is closely associated with 
choice. This view of choice would also make discussion of 
other values such as justice and equality unnecessary. That is, 
whatever is produced by choice is necessarily good. This view 
of choice is used in our society as a justification for continued 
racial subjugation and to obscure the way in which structure 
and systems reproduce racial inequality in our schools and 
larger society.
86
 
Choice, then, fits squarely within the Process Theory and Rhetorical 
Neutrality: choice is directly compatible with the representation 
reinforcement theory because its emphasis is on access to the process 
without any consideration of the continuing effects of past 
discrimination. So, substantive integration of the schools is merely a 
secondary concern or not a concern at all. The concern now is 
individual choice, and this affects the policy choices of the political 
communities in Louisville and St. Louis. 
II. THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY 
It is ironic that, in Louisville, the actions of African-American 
parents who wanted their children to attend a neighborhood school 
 
 84. Parker, supra note 6; Smith, supra note 13, at 1144 (―[I]n 2007 the state of Missouri 
unaccredited the St. Louis school district and transferred control from the St. Louis school 
board to a ‗Transitional School District.‘‖). 
 85. See Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and 
American Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814 (2011). 
 86. powell, supra note 66, at 672.  
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ultimately led to the litigation that would overturn the voluntary 
school assignment plan. In Hampton v. Jefferson County Board of 
Education, African-American plaintiffs moved to dissolve a consent 
decree that they claimed had ―outlasted its utility.‖87 ―The district 
court dissolved the desegregation decree, concluding that ‗[t]o the 
greatest extent practicable, the Decree has eliminated the vestiges 
associated with the former policy of segregation and its pernicious 
effects.‘‖88 ―There is a certain inevitability about the plaintiffs‘ 
claim—the formerly injured parties are now asserting a claim from 
‗relief‘—since there is no identifiable discrimination to remedy, so a 
race-conscious remedy is inherently suspect and constitutionally 
invalid.‖89 This assertion of an individual right to attend a 
neighborhood school would ultimately lead to the post-racial decision 
of the Court in Parents Involved and the neighborhood school 
movement that would follow in its wake: 
Hampton sets the stage: It is much easier for the Court [in 
Parents Involved] to advance its disturbing rationale that 
discrimination no longer exists in the wake of a previously 
successful challenge, advanced by African-American parents, 
which embraced liberal individualism and colorblind 
constitutionalism. Since there was no de jure discrimination to 
eradicate, the voluntary integration program of the Jefferson 
County Public Schools was constitutionally invalid.
90
 
 What is particularly striking about the Louisville experience is 
that even after the consent decree was lifted, the community 
implemented a voluntary school assignment policy that fully 
embraced integrated schools and diversity. Notwithstanding the 
process-based rhetoric of Hampton, the political community of 
Louisville rejected liberal individualism and choice which was 
 
 87. 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 363 (W.D. Ky. 2000). 
 88. Trucios-Haynes & Powell, supra note 15, at 957 (quoting Hampton v. Jefferson Cnty. 
Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d at 360). 
 89. Id. at 952. Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 359 (―[U]sually, it is the school board trying 
to shed its obligations under a desegregation order . . . [n]ever before have the plaintiffs been 
African-Americans, for whose supposed benefit such decrees were entered.‖).  
 90. Trucios-Haynes & Powell, supra note 15, at 952 n.24. 
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disconnected from maintaining integrated schools.
91
 ―[T]here is no 
reason to deny school districts the ability voluntarily to adopt 
integration plans that seek to prevent de facto resegregation.‖92 Once 
the Court intervenes and disrupts the efforts of the political 
community in Louisville, there is a pronounced shift from a 
substantive (race-conscious) remedial approach to a process-oriented 
approach that protects white interests. As Professor Spann observes: 
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has taken it upon 
itself to protect the white majority from minority advances 
even when the white majority itself has authorized those 
advances in the form of affirmative action or integration plans. 
The Court has done this by concluding that such programs 
deny the equal protection rights of the white majority, despite 
the fact that it is the white majority who has chosen to adopt 
those plans. Stated differently, the white majority decided that 
it was in its own best interest to reduce the continuing effects 
of white privilege in our racially pluralist culture. But the 
Supreme Court, nevertheless, told the white majority that the 
Constitution required white privilege to persist.
93
 
This is the essence of the post-racial Equal Protection Clause—
structural inequalities are preserved through neutrality, formalistic 
definitions of equality, and a presumption in favor of non-substantive 
results.  
By contrast, in St. Louis, there was a collaborative-
communitarian
94
 approach to school integration, but the outcome was 
again limited by a presumption in favor of process over substance. 
Again, the interests of African-American students were secondary to 
 
 91. From 1975 to 2000, the school district in Louisville operated under a consent decree. 
―The decree was dissolved in 2000, when the District Court held that Louisville had achieved 
unitary status. Nevertheless from 2001 to the present, Louisville operated under a voluntarily 
adopted integration plan that was designed to maintain the level of integration achieved under 
the previous desegregation decree.‖ Spann, supra note 23, at 569–70.  
 92. Id. at 596 (emphasis in original). 
 93. Id. at 607–08 (emphasis in original). 
 94. Aderson Bellegarde François, Only Connect: The Right to Community and the 
Individual Liberty Interest in State-Sponsored Racial Integration, 112 PENN. STATE L. REV. 
985, 1015–22 (2008) (arguing for an individual right to community rooted in integrated schools 
and a rejection of liberal individualism).  
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the overall process-oriented interests of the system.
95
 A 1983 
settlement provided for voluntary interdistrict transfers from city to 
suburban county schools, magnet schools, capital improvements, and 
quality education for those African-American students who remained 
in the city schools.
96
 Each component of the 1983 settlement had 
varying degrees of success,
97
 but the quality of education component 
was the least successful. 
It appears there were problems with this aspect of the settlement 
from the beginning. Indeed, a decision was made that there would be 
some schools that were not fully integrated, ten thousand to fifteen 
thousand students would remain in all-black city schools, and these 
students were guaranteed a ―quality education‖ however that was 
defined.
98
 In St. Louis, the political community avoided a full-blown 
interdistrict remedy
99
 and instead focused on voluntary interdistrict 
transfers—the students who remained in the city schools did not 
receive a substantive remedy.
100
 They received ―access‖ to a process 
that was not fully funded, did not provide effective instruction for 
college, and lacked academic rigor.
101
 This illustrates the limitations 
of a process-based policy choice. 
III. LIBERAL INDIVIDUALISM AND THE CONCEPTUAL FALLACY OF 
NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS 
De facto school segregation is directly traceable to segregated 
housing;
102
 therefore, it is quite disturbing to see the arguments for 
neighborhood schools in Louisville. However, these arguments are 
inevitable when they are placed in the context of Hampton, Parents 
Involved, and the preference for process-based neutrality over 
 
 95. See supra Part I. 
 96. The Special Master‟s Tale, supra note 1, at 1001–06. 
 97. Freivogel¸ supra note 13, at 219–23. 
 98. The Special Master‟s Tale, supra note 1, at 1005. 
 99. Freivogel, supra note 13, nn.17–21 and accompanying text. 
 100. Smith, supra note 13, at 1153 (―Of 100 black ninth-grade students attending city 
schools, statistically only six would graduate and attend a four-year college.‖).  
 101. Freivogel, supra note 13, at 221–23. 
 102. Spann, supra note 23, at 656. 
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substantive equality.
103
 Neighborhood schools offer parents a false 
and illusory choice: 
Neighborhood schools are another ―innovation‖ and are 
antagonistic to the goal of racial and economic integration. 
Although they have the benefit of potentially allowing parental  
involvement, in communities and families where poverty is 
high, it is often impossible for parents to become involved at 
target levels. In addition to producing inconsistent results as 
regards parental involvement, neighborhood schools reinforce 
racial and economic isolation by leaving residential 
segregation untouched. Neighborhood schooling is a 
detrimental reform type, also, in that its implementation masks 
the fact that racial hierarchy has been inscribed into residential 
patterns—allowing, instead, families to believe that they have 
exercised a choice in housing and, therefore, a choice as to 
which schools their children will attend. This falsity attaches 
strongly to the reform of neighborhood schools.
104
 
Given the neutral allure of this false choice, it is no surprise that 
substantive integration of Louisville‘s public schools has taken the 
proverbial back seat to individualized claims to attend neighborhood 
schools. Since formal de jure segregation has been ―cured‖ by the 
lifting of the consent decree,
105
 any race-conscious remedial approach 
is antithetical to neutral process values. This leads to a narrow, 
formalistic interpretation of equality. A recent Kentucky case  
provides a graphic example of this legal formalism. 
A. Kentucky Revised Statute § 159.070 and Rhetorical Neutrality 
Advancing a statutory right to attend neighborhood schools, the 
parents of Louisville Jefferson County Public School (JCPS) students 
recently brought suit in circuit court.
106
 The language of the statute, 
 
 103. See supra Parts I–II. 
 104. powell, supra note 66, at 691–92. 
 105. Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 721 (―Once 
Jefferson County achieved unitary status, it has remedied the constitutional wrong that allowed 
race-based assignments.‖). 
 106. Fell v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2010-CA-001830-MR, 2011 WL 4502673 
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Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) § 159.070, provides in relevant 
part: ―Within the appropriate school district attendance area, parents 
or legal guardians shall be permitted to enroll their children in the 
public school nearest their home.‖107 Construing the language of the 
statute, the circuit court held there was no statutory right to attend 
neighborhood schools. ―The circuit court concluded that the term 
enroll means to ‗register‘ and not to attend the school.‖108 
Reversing the circuit court, the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
concluded there was a legislative mandate to enroll students in 
schools nearest their home: ―[T]he legislature has declared the right 
of every parent or legal guardian to enroll his or her child in the 
school nearest his or her home.‖109 In many ways, this decision is the 
doctrinal descendant of Hampton and Parents Involved. It crafts a 
statutory right to attend neighborhood schools through liberal 
individualism, it neutralizes the history of KRS § 159.070 by 
focusing on the formalistic distinction between ―enroll‖ and 
―register‖ rather than the historical purpose of the statute, which was 
to function as a ―freedom-of-choice‖ plan akin to the one held 
unconstitutional in Green,
110
 and it disconnects the present day 
effects of past discrimination, in the form of segregated housing, by 
literally erasing discrimination based on the lifting of the consent 
decree in 2000.
111
 Racial imbalance is not ―segregation‖ because the  
 
(Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2011). 
 107. Id. at *1. ―This provision originally provided that ‗within the appropriate school 
district attendance area, parents or legal guardians shall be permitted to enroll their children for 
attendance in the public school nearest their home.‖ Id. at *5 (emphasis added). The words, ―for 
attendance,‖ were deleted when the statute was amended in 1990. Id. at *6.  
 108. Id. at *5 (emphasis in original). This conclusion is supported by the language and 
legislative intent of the statute itself: ―Without that modifying phrase [‗for attendance‘], enroll 
now undoubtedly connotes the mere act of registering at a neighborhood school without the 
mandate, assurance, or even the implication that attendance at that same school should be 
guaranteed.‖ Id. at *12 (emphasis in original) (Combs, J., dissenting from the Court of Appeals‘ 
reversal of the circuit court opinion).  
 109. Id. at *8. 
 110. Id. at *7–8. 
 111. Id. at *2 (noting that when the federal district court, in Hampton, lifted the consent 
decree, it rejected concerns about resegregation by stating that ―[t]he constitutional purpose of 
all this was never to change housing patterns.‖). 
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absence of a consent decree means that formal discrimination has 
ended.
112
 This is the process-based effect of Parents Involved.
113
 
There is a substantial amount of inequality that cannot be 
remedied because the court refuses to acknowledge structural 
inequality and the continuing effects of past discrimination. Since 
there is no longer any de jure segregation, parents have the right to 
send their children to the neighborhood school.
114
 This false choice 
simply reinforces existing patterns of residential segregation, yet the 
court relies on the facile notion that ―[t]he benefit of children 
attending neighborhood schools is obvious.‖115  
What is striking about the Court of Appeals‘ decision in Fell v. 
Jefferson County Board of Education is that it neutralizes the history 
of state-mandated segregation in Louisville in order to create an 
individualized right to attend neighborhood schools. Specifically, 
JCPS was exempt from KRS 159.070, with its initial legislative 
purpose to circumvent federal court-ordered desegregation,
116
 
because it was under a consent decree.
117
 Once the consent decree 
was lifted, the Court of Appeals reasoned that:  
Logically, if KRS 159.070 still requires that parents and legal 
guardians have the right to choose for their children to attend 
their neighborhood school, JCPS, no longer being under 
federal supervision and direction to desegregate, must comply 
with the statute.
118
 
It seems counterintuitive that an exemption from a statutory 
provision designed to preserve (segregated) neighborhood 
schools, like the constitutionally discredited freedom-of-choice 
plans,
119
 could now be cast aside in the name of ―compliance.‖ In 
other words, before the consent decree was lifted, the exemption 
 
 112. Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 729–32. 
 113. See supra Part I.A. 
 114. Fell v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2010-CA-001830-MR, 2011 WL 4502673, 
*8-10 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2011). 
 115. Id. at *9; see powell, supra note 65, at 691–92. 
 116. Fell v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2010-CA-001830-MR, 2011 WL 4502673, at 
*5.  
 117. Id. at *8. 
 118. Id.  
 119. See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.  
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took JCPS out of the scope of the anti-desegregation 
(neighborhood schools) statute. Thus, JCPS could comply with 
the federally mandated consent decree, not the statutory 
neighborhood school policy. Under the Court of Appeals‘ inverted 
reading of compliance, since the consent decree had been lifted, 
JCPS ―must comply with the statute,‖ notwithstanding the 
significant possibility of resegregated schools.
120
 Fortunately, on 
September 20, 2012, this reasoning was rejected by the Kentucky 
Supreme Court.
121
 
 Upholding the JCPS school assignment plan and reaffirming 
the autonomy of local school boards to chart their own course in 
maintaining integrated schools, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
concluded that ―Kentucky public school students have no 
statutory right to attend a particular school.‖122 Rejecting the 
contention that the statute explicitly authorized neighborhood 
schools, the court concluded that ―Kentucky law does not grant a 
statutory right for schoolchildren to attend the school nearest their 
home.‖123 Concluding that student assignment is within the sound 
discretion and institutional competence of the local school 
board,
124
 the 5–2 majority opinion, authored by Justice Abramson, 
reverses the formalistic and ahistorical interpretation of the statute 
advanced by the Court of Appeals.
125
 
 This is certainly a hopeful note upon which to end the 
Louisville story. Yet, the judicial conclusion to this case shifts its 
resolution to the political arena where fifteen candidates will 
compete for three seats on the Jefferson County school board.
126
 
 
 120. See Spann, supra note 23.  
 121. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Fell, No. 2011-SC-000658-DGE, 2012 WL 4243659 
(Ky. Sept. 20, 2012). 
 122. Id. at *1.  
 123. Id. at *12. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at *1.  
 126. Antoinette Konz, Neighborhood School Advocates Look To Fall School Board 
Elections After Kentucky Supreme Court „Disappointment‟, COURIER-JOURNAL.COM (Sept. 20, 
2012), http://www.courier-journal.com/article/20120920/NEWS0105/309200077/Neighbor 
hood-school-advocates-look-fall-school-board-elections-after-Kentucky-Supreme-Court-dis 
appointment-.  
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Neighborhood schools will be the centerpiece of half of the 
candidates‘ campaign platforms.127 
B. Louisville and St. Louis: Closing Propositions 
Louisville and St. Louis are uniquely linked in the annals of 
school integration jurisprudence; both cities have struggled with the 
problems of segregation in education for over forty years. Several 
themes emerge from the preceding discussion: 
1. Louisville and St. Louis share a common doctrinal thread: 
both cities began the process of integrating their schools in the 
context of the United States Supreme Court‘s shift from a 
substantive approach to a process-oriented approach;
128
 
2. Both cities embraced process-based outcomes through a 
distinct course of events: in Louisville, the substantive interest 
in integration was displaced when African-American plaintiffs 
brought suit to lift the consent decree, and the Court would 
base its ruling invalidating Louisville‘s voluntary school 
assignment plan on the fact that there was no de jure 
segregation to remedy;
129
 
3. In St. Louis, a settlement, buttressed by the threat of an 
interdistrict remedy, resulted in a voluntary transfer plan that 
ultimately left some African-American students behind in the 
city with the illusory promise of a ―quality education‖;130 
 
 127. Id.  On November 6, 2012, David Jones, Jr., Chuck Haddaway, and Chris Brady won 
election to the school board in Louisville.  ―None of the candidates seeking to end the current 
school assignment plan in favor of one emphasizing neighborhood schools was victorious.‖  
Antoinette Konz, Jones, Haddaway, Brady will be panel‟s new faces; neighborhood school 
advocates shut out; lawyer vows suit on Jones‟ eligibility, COURIER-JOURNAL.COM (Nov. 7, 
2012), http://www.courier-journal.com/article/20121106/NEWS0106/311060025/JCPS-school-
board-jones?nclick_check=1.  Brady‘s victory was particularly noteworthy because it came at 
the expense of the named plaintiff in the school assignment case, Christopher Fell.  Brady stated 
that ―[n]eighborhood schools were not as big of an issue as some thought it would be,‖ and that 
his focus would be on closing the achievement gap. Id.   
 128. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 129. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 721. 
 130. See Freivogel, supra note 13; BELL, supra note 18; MONTI, supra note 18. 
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4. Despite years of innovation, both cities face challenges 
providing education in a fully integrated school system;
131
 and 
5. Neutral or individualized claims of equal opportunity have 
made substantive race-conscious remedies irrelevant in both 
cities—neighborhood schools are the focus in Louisville and 
charter schools in St. Louis.
132
 
It should be obvious that neutral, process-based approaches to the 
problem of resegregation are limited in their efficacy. If political 
communities agree on race-conscious remedial approaches to the 
eradication of inferior and unequal schools, those policies should be 
accorded full deference.  
CONCLUSION 
The demographics of race are exploding in every facet of 
American life. America has become more inclusive, which is 
progress. However, this progress has been mixed: we have litigated, 
compromised, settled, embraced diversity and integration, and 
rejected inclusiveness to advance neighborhood schools in the name 
of individual choice. We have voluntarily integrated while leaving 
substantial numbers of students behind. Like much of our racial 
history, our triumphs are episodic. It is no coincidence that the 
Roberts Court will address affirmative action this term.
133
 The Court 
has been openly hostile to race-conscious remedial efforts to 
eradicate the vestiges of discrimination. 
We must continue to advance and implement the ideas that we 
explore here today because schools are at the very core of American 
democracy
134—they are the gateway to America‘s future. Minnie 
Liddell‘s legacy calls to us to continue the struggle for substantive 
equality. 
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